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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES E. PITTS and
ETHEL J. PITTS,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 14454

-vsLEO ROBERTS,
Defendant and
Respondent.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff to have a paved alleyway across defendant's land declared a public thoroughfare or
to have defendant's land declared subject to a prescriptive
easement for plaintiffs' use of said alleyway and to prohibit
the defendant from blocking said alleyway.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court.

The Court filed two

Memorandum Decisions and defendant prepared Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment for the defendant therefrom
from which plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Judgment of the Trial
Court and Judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or failing that, a new trial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The record on appeal consists of two volumes and an
envelope containing exhibits.

All references to the volume

comprised of the pleadings, minute entries and similar
papers are designated by the letter "R".

All references to

the volume consisting of the transcript of the testimony and
proceedings held June 10, 1975, are designated by the letter
"T".

Exhibits are referred to by the number assigned by the

trial court.
This action involves the right to use an alleyway
which runs East and West between Emery Street (1170 West)
and Concord Street (1255 West) at approximately 420 South in
Salt Lake City, Utah.
In 1890 the Golden Park Subdivision and the Amended
Plat Golden Park were recorded with the Salt Lake County
Recorder (Pps 36,39, Exhibit 1-d). The Jordan Place Subdivision was recorded shortly thereafter and both subdivisions,
as far as this action is concerned, are shown on the official
plat of the Salt Lake County Recorder known as the NW 1/4
SW 1/4 Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 1 West (Exhibit 2-P).
This plat depicts the alleyway in question as being 16 feet
in width running eastward from Concord Street until it reaches
defendant's property, Lots 1 and 13, Amended Plat Golden Park,
where said plat shows the alleyway narrowing to 6 feet in width.
Proceeding chronologically the history of the alleyway
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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is as follows:

In 1920 the alleyway Iwest] from Emery Street

was the same width as it is today (T 81) and the surface was
gravel (T 81).

It was used by everyone in the area (T 81).

Between 1920 and 1936 a family named Potter operated a public
garage for repairing and painting of cars on the east end of
the alley (T 82, T 84, T 87, Exhibit 13-d), with the primary
entrance way off of the alleyway (T 87).
In 1936 the alleyway was gravel and cinders (T 95) and
was still being used by Potters Garage (T 95) as well as coal
trucks making deliveries (T 95), movement of cows (T 95),
delivery of hay (T 95) and general usage by the public (T 82) .
In 1946, plaintiffs and appellants Charles and Ethel
Pitts purchased a house located at 423 Concord Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and they have lived there to the present
time (T 62).

At said time the alleyway was a graveled road

(T 63) and plaintiffs traveled the entire length of the alleyway (T 63) almost every day except when their truck was out
of service (T 66) .
Sometime prior to 1952 the alleyway was paved west from
Emery Street to Potters Garage (T 83) which blacktop was across
defendant's property (Exhibit 13-d).

Between 1950 and 1954

(T 68, T 85) the entire length of the alley was paved with
blacktop by Salt Lake City Street Department (T 96, T 97) and
has existed in a similar condition to the present time (T 52,
Exhibit 3-P).
When the alleyway was paved by the City Street DepartDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment the blacktop was placed so that at the easterly end of
the alleyway from 6 feet to 8 feet of defendant's property
was covered with the paving material (Exhibit 3-P). The
alleyway has remained in the same general condition since the
paving (T 70).
Since 1952 to the time of trial the paved alleyway has
been used daily by plaintiff (T 66), various automobiles
(T 98, T 114), children coming from school (T 85) and playing
on bicycles (T 65, T 85), motor scooters (T 65), motorcycles
(T 85), tenants of apartments on the alleyway (T 90), as well
as landowners abutting the alleyway (T 81, T 96).

None of

these parties obtained permission from anyone to use said
alleyway (T 66, T 83, T 96).
At one time there was a dedicated alleyway running
north and south between Fourth South Street and the subject
alleyway just West of defendant's property (Exhibits 2-P and
3-P).

Said alleyway was vacated in December of 1952 (Exhibits

7-d and 9-d). Said side alleyway was not used by vehicular
traffic prior to December of 1952 (T 75, T 77) and has power
poles down the center thereof (T 77, T 78), was covered with
weeds (T 89) and was not used by anyone (T 86) except for power
line maintenance (T 87).
In June of 1971 defendant and respondent Leo Roberts
moved into the house located at 420 Emery Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and he has lived there to the present time (T 109).
When he moved into said house he had a survey made (Exhibit 6-d)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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which shows, by scale that there was an 8-foot wide asphalt
walkway to the south of his house.

Defendants house faces

south (T 112) and he was able to see the alleyway from his
front door (T 112) and observed daily vehicular traffic upon
said paved alleyway (T 114).
On occasion since defendant moved into his present
residence he has blocked the alleyway with trash cans (T 114)
and his automobile (T 115) for varying lengths of time but
has never put a permanent blockade in the alley (T 116).
Defendant asserts that he owns the alleyway property
and is entitled to a Decree quieting title to said property
(R 6 ) .

- 5 -
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
IN THE ALLEYWAY ACROSS DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY BY
CONTINUOUS USE OVER A PERIOD EXCEEDING 20 YEARS.
The requirements for obtaining a prescriptive easement
are set out clearly in 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY (3rd Edition)
§1191 at page 960, as follows:
"To acquire easement over land by prescription it is necessary to show use:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Adverse to the owner.
Under claim of right.
Open,
Notorious
Continuous
Uninterrupted
For the period of prescription."

The Utah Supreme Court has followed said requirements
in Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, wherein
the court further stated at page 315:
"The origin and purpose of their [prescriptive rights] recognition arises
out of the general policy of the law of
assuring the peace and good order of
society by leaving a long established
status quo at rest rather than by distributing it. In order to serve this purpose,
when a claimant has shown that a use has
existed peaceably and without interferance for the prescriptive period of 20
years, the law presumes that the use is
adverse to the owner; and that it had a
legitimate origin."
Rights of easement by prescription have at all times
been recognized in Utah.

The time required for an easement

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to ripen by adverse use has been set at 20 years by the Utah
Supreme Court.

See Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127

(1916) and Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P.2d
1000 (1972).
Plaintiffs have testified, and their testimony is
supported by other witnesses and is totally uncontroverted,
that they have used the alleyway openly and continuously since
1946 (T 65) and that the only interruption to said use came in
1971 when defendant temporarily blocked said alleyway (T 67).
Said usage well exceeds the 20 year prescriptive period by
five years, thereby raising the presumption that said use
was adverse to the owner.
The claim of right to use the alleyway asserted by the
plaintiff is that the alleyway was apparently and obviously
a graveled passageway open to use by the general public.

No

permission was sought from anyone to use said alleyway nor
was any received (T 66).

Between 1946 and 1966 the prescrip-

tive period was well established prior to defendant's blocking
the alleyway and temporarily interrupting the use thereof
subsequent to 1971.

Once the prescriptive use is established

it follows with the land and future owners are bound thereby.
Uncontroverted testimony of two witnesses established
the paving of the alleyway between 1950 and 1954 (T 68, T 83).
The period between said date and the filing of the complaint
in this action in September of 1974 is more than adequate for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the 20-year prescriptive period.

The City in paving the

alleyway recognized the public good in the use thereof and
has since recognized that vehicular traffic was to use said
alley by placing a drive approach to said alleyway in the
new curb and gutter installed on Concord and Emery Streets
(T 53, Exhibits 3-P, 5-P).
Argument was made by defendantfs counsel at trial that
plaintiffs had personally used the alley for a period of only
17 years.

Said argument was opposed by plaintiffs1 counsel

on the basis that said position was not supported by facts
presented at trial.

The trial court in its second Memorandum

Decision (R 28) states that plaintiffs have shown only 17
years use of the alleyway and said statement was incorporated
into the Findings of Fact executed by the Court (R 37, H8).
A careful and exhaustive analysis of the transcript does not
disclose any basis for said finding in plaintiffs1 testimony
or in the testimony of any of the witnesses and it is submitted
that said finding is in error and that plaintiffs have used
said alleyway in excess of 20 years and has thereby obtained a
prescriptive easement to the continued use thereof.

POINT II
PUBLIC USE OF THE ALLEYWAY FOR A PERIOD IN
EXCESS OF TEN YEARS HAS ESTABLISHED A PUBLIC
HIGHWAY BY USE ACROSS DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.
"Public use constituting dedication. - a
highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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when it has been continuously used as a
public thoroughfare for a period of ten
vears." Utah Code Annotated 27-12-89
Repl. (1953)
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision (R 11) held
that plaintiffe did not comply with the above statute in that
testimony as to the public use of the alley came only from
abutting property owners.

The court based its decision upon

Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968).

Said

case held at page 377 that "furthermore it was not alleged
that any member or members of the general public used the road,
save the property owners in this area.

Such property owners

cannot be considered members of the public generally, as that
term is used in dedication by user's statutes/1
The case before the court can clearly be distinguished
from Petersen v. Combe.

It is true that the testimony in

this matter came solely from property owners abutting the
alley.

However, their testimony was to the effect that not

only they used the alley without permission but that it was
used by general vehicular traffic (T 114), children on the
way to school (T 85), couples on motor scooters and for
garbage collection (T 65), delivery of coal,(T 95), driving
and pasturing of cows and delivery of hay (T 95), and was used
by the public for entrance to a garage and repair shop (T 95).
While the court in Petersen v. Combe upbraided the
plaintiffs1 witnesses as being property owners abutting and
straddling the road in question and "having deraigned title
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

directly or indirectly from homesteader Michael Combe",
20 Utah 2d 376, 378; 438 P.2d 545, 547, the court did go on
to say that these property owners "could testify as to what
others not so situate might have done to perfect a dedication.,."
op cit., supra.

The witnesses in the present case/ being

abutting property owners; were in a prime location to testify
as to use of the alleyway by the general public.

Said use by

the general public extended from the 1920,s to the time of
trial when a 12-unit apartment house was being constructed on
the alley with parking for tenants and guests only accessible
from the alleyway (T 70).
In Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2nd 212, 341 P.2d 424
(1959), the court held that testimony by witnesses establishing that a lane had been used by the general public either by
walking or riding in wagons and later in automobiles and by
people either going to church or to fish in the creek at the
end of the road was sufficient to establish a dedication by
public use.

It is submitted that similar testimony has been

submitted in the within case and that the finding of fact
entered by the court (paragraph 2 of R 37) is not supported
by the evidence adduced at trial.
The fact that the testimony of the witnesses could
specify the identity of only a relatively few members of the
general public using the alleyway is insufficient to find
that there has not been a dedication by public user, Boyer v,
Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958) held that a continDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uous use for a period exceeding 50 years, even though not
consisting of a great many persons, \<?as sufficient as a
matter of law to establish a highway by dedication. Witnesses
at the trial testified that although the alleyway was used by
"everyone" (T 85) that specific identity of public members
were limited to those who could be readily identified.
Plaintiffs1 contention that a public highway has been
established over and across said alleyway is amply supported
by the fact that the City, in recognition of the public use
of said highway has paved the alleyway (T 96) and has placed
said pavement over and across the southerly 6 to 8 feet of
defendants land since the previously existing gravelled
alleyway crossed said same portion of defendant's land (T 62).
It is submitted that the public use of the alley, along with
the recognition of the public use of said alleyway by the
Salt Lake City Streets Department is sufficient under the
provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953/
to establish a public highway across defendant's property.

POINT III
NECESSITY IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.
The trial court in paragraphs of its Findings of Fact
stated,
"6. That the evidence presented is
absolutely lacking as to any evidence
or necessity for use of said strip of
property by plaintiffs." (R 37)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Said finding is presumably based upon the Memorandum Decision
of the court dated June 11, 1975, (R 12) and is founded on the
case of Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 (1954).
An analysis of Thompson indicates that three claims were
submitted by appellant for decision by the Supreme Court, said
claims being outlined at page 340 as follox^s:
"Appellant claims (1) an easement by prescription; (2) that a public road exists over
said 14 feet of the Thompson property; (3)
that it has an implied right of way over
said 14 feet."
The question of an easement by prescription presented
as item 1 for consideration by the court was decided against
the appellant on the basis that appellant

ff

did not, during

any period of 20 years, continuously, uninterruptedly, or
adversely travel over the east 14 feet of the Thompson property."

2 Utah 2d 340, 342, 273 P.2d 720, 722. Thus, the

court quickly dispensed with appellant's claim of prescriptive
easement and went on to discuss item 3 relating to implied
easements.

It was in regards to the court's discussion of

the implied easement that the court stated on page 343 of its
decision that the essential elements of an implied easement
are:
"1.
2.

A separation of title;
Necessity that, before the separation
takes place, the use which gives rise
to the easement shall have been so long
continued and obvioused or manifest as
to show that it was meant to be permanent;
and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

Necessity that the easement be essential

to the beneficial enjoyment of the
land granted or retained.11
Necessity, therefore, as required by the trial court
in its Memorandum Decision and in its finding of fact, relates solely to an implied easement, and an implied easement,
relates to the condition of a separation of title.

Since a

separation of title is not in question before the court in
the present case and an implied easement has not been presented
or argued, the element of necessity is inapplicable to the
matter before the court.
The court clearly defines the difference between a
fl

way of necessity" and a "prescriptive right of way11 in the

case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P. 2d 117 (1948).
The court stated at page 32, lfa way of necessity arises from
the existence of such necessity at the time of the dividing
of the property.

A right of way by prescription can only be

obtained by satisfying certain other requirements.

These

requirements may, for all practical purposes, be included
within the three set out below, although the cases under
particular fact situation have emphasized other subdivisions.
The three uses are: (1) continuous; (2) open; and (3) adverse
under a claim of right.11

Under the requirements of Savage,

it is not necessary that plaintiff prove necessity for the
use of the alleyway and it is apparent that he has met the
continuous, open and adverse under a claim of right requirements established by said case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs1 witnesses, some who have lived in the area
of the alleyway in question since 1920, and all who have lived
there since 1946, have given uncontroverted testimony as to
the use of the alleyway by the general public for more than
ten.years.

Plaintiff has given uncontroverted testimony that

he has personally used the alleyway across the defendant's
property from 1946 to 1974, well in excess of the 20-year
prescriptive easement requirements.

These two facts when

viewed with the fact that Salt Lake City paved the alleyway
over 20 years ago, clearly and unequivocably leads to the
conclusion that the south 8 feet of defendant's property is
(1) a public highway by use, or (2) subject to a prescriptive
easement for plaintiffs1 use, and the court is requested to
make such a decision.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT C. LILJENQUIST
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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